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With the creation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), an area of international law
may have become more like law as we commonly perceive it. Yet it is not necessarily the
neutral technocratic process some of its proponents make it to be. Whatever is one’s perspective
on trade liberalization and its enforcement, developing countries and developing country
constituents are at a disadvantage before the WTO’s dispute settlement system. If the United
States and European Community (“EC”) have dozens of well-trained governmental lawyers and
still frequently rely on assistance from private law firms, enterprises, and trade associations, how
can developing countries manage?
Developing countries vary significantly in terms of the size of their economies and the
role of law in their domestic systems. Nonetheless, they generally face three primary challenges
if they are to participate effectively in the WTO dispute settlement system. These challenges are:
(i) a relative lack of legal expertise in WTO law and the capacity to organize information
concerning trade barriers and opportunities to challenge them; (ii) constrained financial
resources, including for the hiring of outside legal counsel to effectively use the WTO legal
system, which has become increasingly costly; and (iii) fear of political and economic pressure
from members exercising market power, and in particular the United States and EC, undermining
their ability to bring WTO claims. We can roughly categorize these challenges as constraints of
legal knowledge, financial endowment, and political power, or, more simply, of law, money and
politics.2
This paper explores various strategies for responding to these three challenges, none of
which involves a modification of the rules of the WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the DSU), or of WTO jurisprudence. WTO members have
been discussing an amendment of the DSU through a special negotiating session since 1997, but
without reaching any consensus.3 This paper does not address the challenges posed by WTO
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dispute settlement rules themselves, such as the system’s weak remedies which reduce the
benefits of participation, nor does it address the impact of WTO jurisprudence on the costs of
participation. These issues will be addressed in a separate study.4
In light of resource constraints, developing countries will obviously choose to dedicate
more resources to other trade-related development initiatives than to WTO dispute settlement.
Yet if the legal system is to work for them, they will need to examine cost-effective means to
deploy it. While developing countries, and especially smaller ones, may not trade the volume or
variety of products as large members, the trade barriers that they confront can often be of greater
relative importance to their economies. That is, while they may have low absolute stakes in the
trading system in relation to total world trade, they can have higher relative stakes in relation to
their particular economies.5 There is thus a need to examine strategies for them to make better
use of the current system
1. The Challenge of Internal Capacity: The Need for Bureaucratic and Public-Private
Network Coordination. In order for a WTO member to use the WTO system successfully, it must
develop cost-effective mechanisms to perceive injuries to its trading prospects, identify who is
responsible, and mobilize resources to bring a legal claim or negotiate a favorable settlement. In
the domestic socio-legal literature, these stages of dispute resolution are referred to as “naming,
blaming and claiming.”6 In the WTO context, a member’s participation in the system will be, in
part, a function of its ability to process knowledge of trade injuries, their causes, and their
relation to WTO rights. Hiring lawyers to defend WTO claims is of little help if countries lack
cost-effective mechanisms to identify and prioritize claims in the first place. Even where
countries become aware of actionable injuries, this awareness will not be transformed into legal
claims if, based on experience, officials lack confidence that a claim is worth pursuing in light of
high litigation costs, weak remedies, and political risks.
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The United States and EC have developed formal and informal legal mechanisms to
identify foreign trade barriers, to prioritize them according to their impact, and to mobilize
resources for WTO complaints.7 They have mobilized resources through interagency
coordination and networking with the private sector, which, in turn, has engaged private law
firms. Although many of the larger developing countries have taken significant steps in this
direction, all developing countries face considerable internal bureaucratic hurdles. These hurdles
include a bureaucratic tradition of foreign affairs ministries assuming the lead on trade dispute
matters in which they have limited background; a lack of support from home capitals; a lack of
financial and informational support from the private sector; a lack of legal expertise; and
language barriers.8
In contrast to the United States and EC, developing countries have traditionally tended to
assign a lower importance to trade matters within governmental hierarchies.9 While the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) and the EC Trade Commissioner hold cabinet level
positions, most developing countries do not assign a cabinet position for international trade
matters. As a result, many developing countries still have a single diplomatic mission for
handling matters before the WTO and the United Nations (UN) in Geneva. The mission is led by
an official from the foreign affairs ministry since, generally, individuals from that ministry alone
may hold the rank of ambassador. Even where a country has created a separate “head of mission”
for WTO matters from a department that specializes in trade, such individual generally holds a
lower level position in the government hierarchy.
This organizational choice does not mean that trade is invariably given little importance
within the foreign ministry. For example, Brazil’s past two ambassadors to the WTO (Celso
Lafer and Celso de Amorim) became the country’s foreign minister immediately following their
Geneva posting. These assignments have provided Brazil’s mission in Geneva with key support
in the capital. In many cases, however, the assignment of WTO representation to the foreign
affairs ministry indicates that WTO matters are viewed as traditional diplomatic ones, involving
a traditional rotation of personnel to different geographic locations to handle different subject
matter as part of a broad-based career path.
Studies of representation in international organizations have found that, “besides the
representatives from the key member states [such as the US], the attribute most widely shared
among the more influential actors in ... international organizations... was long association with
the organization.”10 Yet the career advancement of most developing country representatives in
Geneva does not depend on their competence in technical WTO matters, and importantly for our
purposes, in trade dispute settlement. Trade dispute settlement is incredibly time-consuming, and
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as noted by two South American analysts, “out of the range of those who decide promotions
within the Ministry [of Foreign Affairs].”11 Diplomatic success traditionally is not measured in
terms of successful international litigation. Moreover, as a result of the diplomatic rotation
system, a country’s WTO unit in Geneva can suffer from a severe lack of continuity. By the time
a replacement becomes versed in WTO matters, the delegate will move onto an unrelated post.12
These career incentives undermine a country’s defense of its trading interests. These bureaucratic
traditions can be difficult to change, especially where high level officials in the country’s foreign
ministry would feel threatened by change.
Developing country missions, in addition, suffer from a lack of support from national
capitals. In light of the considerable complexity of WTO rules and of the WTO institutional
structure, a developing country delegate cannot possibly follow all WTO developments. It has
been estimated that there are over seventy different WTO councils, committees, working parties,
and other groupings, involving over 2,800 meetings each year.13 Unlike the US and EC, most
developing countries cannot afford to fly in officials from the capital for specific WTO meetings.
Developing country delegates often receive little support at all. One former delegate of a
developing country confirmed, “During the entire duration of the Uruguay round, our Genevabased WTO team received two instructions from our capital.”14 Interviewed developing country
diplomats generally admit that they would benefit from much greater organizational support
from home.
The lack of bureaucratic coordination on trade matters can undermine Geneva-based
representatives who might otherwise be more active in dispute settlement. Many developing
countries require the approval of the attorney general’s office in order to file a claim or a third
party submission in a WTO case. This process can involve a complex exchange of formal letters
between multiple ministries in the home country. These ministries can be subject to external
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pressure, especially when the United States or EC is a party to a dispute. Such pressure, even if it
does not induce a developing country to refrain from joining a complaint, can create so much
delay that the Geneva-based official is unable to participate effectively. By the time the Genevabased representative receives the requisite government approval for the country to participate as
a party or third party, the deadline for submissions may have passed. As a consultant who
assisted sub-Saharan African countries notes:
“In most developing countries, particularly those in Africa, all government litigation has
to be authorized or undertaken by the offices of the Attorney General (this is functionally
more analogous to the US Solicitor General than the Attorney General). Without such
clearance, no proceedings can commence. Typically therefore there has to be a complex
exchange of letters (literally) between the Ministry of Trade (Geneva office sends this to
the Minister in Capital who then endorses and sends to), the Attorney General’s office,
(that then has to liaise with) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for consistency with foreign
policy).... The result is that there is extreme delay in delivering instructions to Geneva to
proceed, which often is after the deadline.” 15
Because of lack of support from home, Geneva-based representatives may become discouraged,
reducing their incentive to participate in the dispute settlement system. If a major trade dispute
subsequently arises in which the country is on the defensive, the mission may be utterly lacking
in dispute settlement experience.
Many developing country missions suffer from a lack of national legal expertise in WTO
matters, both within government and in the private bar. Diplomatic postings have generally been
filled by non-lawyers.16 Most developing countries have only one or two lawyers (if any) to
address WTO matters, whether in Geneva or in the home capital. As a representative from a
Southeast Asian member stated, “I am the only lawyer here. I handle all DSU matters, as well as
matters before other WTO committees.”17 There may, moreover, be few (or no) private lawyers
in the country knowledgeable about WTO law. WTO law, as opposed to traditional “public
international law,” has not traditionally been taught in developing countries, although this is
changing in some countries. Many developing countries have, as a result, become dependent on
education at law schools in the United States and Europe to develop local talent, provided that
talent returns home.18
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Finally, most developing country officials must work in a foreign language in WTO
judicial proceedings within this “Anglophone organization.”19 Although English, French and
Spanish are the three official languages of the WTO, English predominates. Even French and
Spanish-speaking delegates are at a linguistic disadvantage. As an Argentine representative
relates: “it is tiring and time consuming to wait for the translation in panel audiences. But also
and perhaps more relevant, is that translation of documents may take 10 days and so it happens
that panelists arrive to audiences without having had time to read them. This may be a
disadvantage vis-á-vis documents submitted by the other part. Panelists have no clue of what our
arguments are while they know the others’, and this is a great disadvantage.”20 The authors of an
Argentine case study also note the value of English at panel hearings: “Sessions could be held in
any official language, but after the initial presentations in Spanish led to yawning and dozing off
by one member of the panel, a decision was taken to continue in English.”21 Delegates speaking
other languages are even worse off. To participate effectively, Thais, Malays and Indonesians, to
give just three examples, would need to master the legal nuances of multiple three-hundred page
WTO judicial decisions, often with limited legal training, and to do so in a foreign tongue.
Yet developing countries need to start somewhere. First, they can try to adapt from
models used by larger developing countries for WTO dispute settlement, such as Brazil, which,
in turn, have learned from US and EC models. As the United States, EC, and Brazil, developing
countries can reorganize and better coordinate their ministries to target more resources at
opening foreign markets for their exports. Some developing countries have created specialized
trade bureaucracies or created specialized dispute settlement units within the foreign ministry.
Some have attempted to adapt career paths to ensure greater continuity in WTO representation.
A number of countries have included lawyers in their delegations. Many have developed closer
relations with the private export sector. Brazil is arguably the most advanced developing country
in this respect, having developed what it terms a “three pillar” structure involving a special WTO
dispute settlement division in its capital Brasilia, coordination on WTO legal matters between
Brazil’s Geneva mission and this unit, and organized relations with the private sector. As part of
this third pillar, the Brazilian government has helped facilitate the training of young attorneys in
Brazilian law firms in WTO dispute settlement in the hope that they can help supplement
constrained governmental resources.22 As one Brazilian representative notes, through creating
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internships in Brazil’s mission in Geneva, “we are trying to spread knowledge of the system in
order to create a critical mass.”23
Second, developing countries could obtain more technical assistance from development
agencies and foundations regarding opportunities for them to exercise their WTO rights. The
WTO, UNCTAD, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law are now providing training programs
in WTO dispute settlement, which many officials have attended.24 Training in dispute settlement
rules, however, is not sufficient. A central part of any dispute settlement process is the
identification of potential legal claims–naming and blaming. As Hoekman and Kostecki write
regarding WTO dispute settlement, “The Advisory Centre on WTO Law focuses only on the
‘downstream’ dimension of enforcement, not on the ‘upstream’ collection of information.”25 The
European Commission realized that it lacked such information after the WTO system was
established in 1995. It hired consultants to identify and report on sectoral trade barriers, which
reports spurred a number of successful WTO complaints.26 Developing countries could request
assistance from development agencies and foundations to help them identify trade barriers,
broken down on a sectoral basis. UNCTAD and the World Bank jointly developed a software
program named SMART (Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade) as a tool to
assist developing countries during the Uruguay Round negotiations. The software permits
countries to run a simulation of the trade effects of trade barriers so as to inform their negotiating
strategies.27 Similar systems could be developed for the purpose of WTO monitoring and
enforcement. Hoekman has proposed that an “independent Special Prosecutor or Advocate” be
mandated “to identify potential WTO violations on behalf of developing countries,” which he
terms an “outsourcing of discovery.” Such a move would address “both the resource constraints
23
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and the incentive problems (fear of cross-issue linkage) that may impede developing country
governments from pursuing cases.”28 These mechanisms could build on, and feed into, WTO
reviews of countries’ compliance with obligations under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
and through WTO oversight committees. They also could be developed on a regional basis
through regional trade associations, possibly with the financial assistance of regional
development organizations.
Such information, however, will only be of use if there is bottom-up demand for them. As
Stephen Denning writes, “Organizations that focus completely on collecting information with
little or no effort to foster people connections end up with repositories of dead documents.”29
Thus, most importantly, developing countries need to develop routinized relations with the
private sector to identify trade barriers and investigate and prioritize them.
The private sector in developing countries, however, has typically viewed WTO dispute
settlement as the government’s job. This perspective can pose a serious problem for developing
country trade officials who have fewer public resources than their US and EC counterparts,
counterparts who have already developed mechanisms to work with their own private sectors.30
Developing country officials could strive to foster the development of a reflex within their export
sectors to assist them in investigating claims and building factual and legal cases, just as the EC
did following the WTO’s creation.31 Developing countries would then have better access to the
information necessary to enforce their trading rights through the dispute settlement system and
through favorable settlement in its shadow. As Tussie and Delich conclude regarding their
review of Argentina’s work with the private sector in dispute settlement, “It would have been
impossible to do the groundwork for the case [which involved Chilean duties on vegetable oils]
without the provision of factual information, statistical data and financial collaboration from
business.”32 The development of public-private networks for trade litigation represents a more
market-based instrument for challenging trade barriers, yet one that government action can
facilitate.33 Because private enterprises do not necessarily have the same interests as the
government, public authorities will need to channel and steer these private resources toward
public ends. Yet unless developing country public-private networks are formed, the resources
may not be made available in the first place.
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2. The Financial Challenge: Subsidized Legal Assistance; Private Sector Support;
Pooling Resources through Regional and International Legal Centers. A second major challenge
that developing countries face is that they have fewer resources to spend on legal assistance to
defend their WTO rights. Their government budgets are constrained, often compounded by debt
obligations, and there are high opportunity costs to investing in WTO litigation as opposed to
other social needs.
Compared to larger, wealthier members, developing countries face much higher relative
and absolute costs in WTO litigation. First, the relative costs of litigation are much higher for
them in relation to the size of their economies and government budgets. Investing in WTO legal
expertise thus makes less sense for them in relation to other budgetary needs. Second, developing
countries face higher absolute costs for an individual case. Since most developing countries
participate less frequently in WTO dispute settlement, they do not benefit from economies of
scale. The US and EC, for example, have respectively participated as a party or third party in
around 98% and 86% of WTO cases that resulted in an adopted decision.34 Because of their prior
and ongoing litigation experience, the US and EC face fewer start-up costs for an individual
case. Put in other words, the US and EC can spread the “fixed costs” of developing internal legal
expertise over more cases than developing countries. For a particular case, the US and EC
expend primarily only the “variable costs” of preparation and litigation of that case. It is thus less
cost-effective for developing countries to develop significant internal legal expertise to handle
WTO complaints.
Developing countries’ best alternative is thus either to work with private law firms,
possibly funded by private enterprises, or with a subsidized legal services organization that is
autonomous of the WTO, such as the Advisory Centre on WTO Law. Both private law firms and
legal service organizations are more likely to be repeat players, representing multiple parties in
WTO litigation over time. Private law firms and subsidized legal services organizations are thus
able to develop legal expertise in a more cost-effective manner which they can deploy for a
particular case.
Another alternative would be for the WTO secretariat or an independent organization to
act as a public prosecutor, similar to the role that the European Commission assumes before the
European Court of Justice within the EC’s legal system. This alternative would expand on
Hoekman’s proposal, since the “special prosecutor” would not only identify claims but also
litigate them, as done in the EC. However, this alternative appears to be politically infeasible at
this time, especially in terms of actual litigation by a special prosecutor, because of challenges to
WTO legitimacy (especially were the prosecutor linked to the WTO secretariat) and because the
most powerful WTO members would not support it. Thus, the only alternatives appear to be
subsidized legal assistance and use of private law firms.35
34
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In many cases, private companies and trade associations can pay for a private law firm
that will work with the government in preparing a WTO case. Some larger developing countries
have worked with the private sector to hire private law firms to assist in the bringing of
complaints. Brazil worked with Sidley Austin Brown & Wood for the cotton and sugar subsidies
cases against the United States and EC. Thailand hired Lalive & Partners in the US-shrimp-turtle
case. Korea hired Marco Bronkers, now with Wilmer Cutler & Pickering, in the Korea-alcohol
case. Some smaller countries have followed suit, such as the Caribbean country of Antigua and
Barbuda in its challenge to U.S. internet gambling restrictions, in which private lawyers from
firms based in the United States and United Kingdom were hired by private companies to help
represent the island nation.36 U.S. and European law firms actively promote their skills in
Geneva, and are often seen in the WTO building for hearings or simply to make contact with
former or potential clients.
Developing countries also have the opportunity to obtain partially subsidized legal
assistance through the Advisory Centre on WTO Law in Geneva, an international legal services
organization.37 The Agreement establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law was signed by
twenty-nine countries on December 1, 1999 at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle,
Washington, and it entered into force on July 15, 2001. With Costa Rica’s plan to join the
Advisory Centre in 2005, all developing countries and customs territories that have participated
in WTO “proceedings [as a complainant or respondent] more than twice and fewer than 18 times
will have joined the Centre.”38 The Centre is funded largely by European governments, although
developing country members (other than the least developed countries) must also pay a
membership fee that is determined in relation to their per capita income and share of world
trade.39 In May 2005, the Centre consisted of eight lawyers, under the executive directorship of
Frieder Roessler, former head of the legal affairs division of the GATT secretariat.
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See Advisory Ctr. WTO Law, Report on Operations: July 2001-June 2002 available at www.acwl.ch), at 8.
Because of the membership fee, a developing country (other than a least developed country) may wait to join the
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the United Kingdom. The term “least developed country” is clearly defined according to United Nations criteria
based on per capita income and related development indicators. The criteria used in the triennial review in 2003
were based on domestic gross domestic product (under $900 average over three years), a human resource weakness
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The Advisory Centre is designed to counsel and represent developing countries so that
they may defend their WTO rights at less-than-market rates that vary depending on the country’s
membership status, share of world trade, and per capita income.40 By May 2005, the Advisory
Centre had represented eight developing countries (Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, and Thailand) in twelve WTO cases, in addition to assisting countries
in the “consultation phase” of disputes and providing consulting advice in respect of potential
claims.41 As a repeat player in WTO litigation, the Advisory Centre can provide legal services to
developing countries in a manner somewhat analogous to the way in which the European
Commission’s Legal Services assists EC member states in WTO litigation. By pooling their
resources, European countries have enhanced their voice and collective knowledge of WTO law
in a cost-effective manner.42 Small European countries, such as Portugal and Ireland and now
most Eastern European countries, may rely on the Commission as a repeat player in WTO
litigation. They are thereby able to participate more effectively in the defense of their interests
and in the overall shaping of WTO law through the judicial process. The Advisory Centre,
although it will operate in a more ad hoc manner for developing countries, can similarly develop
a reservoir of WTO expertise into which developing countries can tap. It can thus more
effectively provide developing country input into the judicial construction of the law over time.
Developing countries could use the Advisory Centre in different ways, depending on
their level of development and the frequency with which they participate in WTO disputes.
Larger, more active countries, such as India, may use the Centre to develop their own national
expertise in WTO dispute settlement.43 Smaller countries that rarely engage in WTO disputes
may find it less cost-effective to develop their own legal expertise and thus almost solely rely on
the Centre, as did Peru in its case against the EC concerning whether its fish species could be
sold in the EC as sardines.44 Yet even larger developing countries, such as India, will find that
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Under the annexes to the agreement establishing the Centre, developing countries are divided into three
categories, A, B and C, with least developed countries (as defined by UN rules) constituting a fourth category. As of
August 2002, hourly rates for the Centre’s members for WTO litigation support were set at $200 for category A
countries, $150 for category B countries and $100 for category C countries. Least developed countries hourly rates
are set at $25. Non-member developing country rates are set at $350 for category A countries, $300 for category B
countries, and $250 for category C countries. See The Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law,
Annex II, Nov. 13, 1999, available at http://www.acwl.ch/Docs/ACWLAgreementEnglish.htm.
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against Turkey was settled. See Report on Operations, supra note _, at 81-84.
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Interview with Peruvian official, in Geneva, Switz. (June 21, 2002). See Gregory Shaffer & Victor Mosoti, “ECSardines: A New Model for Collaboration in Dispute Settlement,” Bridges (ICTSD) 15 (Oct. 2002). Nonetheless,
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the Advisory Centre can provide an important complement to their domestic resources. Just as
the EC has sometimes farmed out WTO cases to private law firms, and just as the USTR and the
EC have collaborated with private counsel hired by private firms, so the Centre can be of
assistance to even the most sophisticated developing country trade administration. In addition,
private enterprises could (indirectly) pay the Centre’s fees or hire a law firm to work with the
Centre’s lawyers. Such collaboration occurred in the WTO case involving EC export subsidies
for sugar, when a U.S. law firm represented Brazil and the Centre represented Thailand as a cocomplainant.45 The Centre, as all participants in WTO litigation, has encountered major
challenges in light of WTO jurisprudential developments that require intensive fact-gathering
and rely less on presumptions and references to general principles.46 Yet the Centre is better able
to adapt to WTO jurisprudence than individual developing countries.
The Advisory Centre could also assist groups of like-minded developing countries in
preparing third party submissions in WTO disputes to defend their systemic interests. In light of
the weakness of the current WTO political system and the resulting importance of individual
WTO cases for the interpretation of WTO law, developing countries should consider organizing
on a more consistent basis to present their views as third parties. Only the United States and EC
participate routinely as third parties in cases where they are not a plaintiff or defendant.47 They
do so especially before the Appellate Body where participation has the greatest systemic impact.
By preparing joint third party submissions, the Advisory Centre could place dispute settlement
panels and the Appellate Body on notice of the views of organized groups of developing
countries in individual cases. Yet the Advisory Centre has never represented a group of
developing countries as third parties.48
In addition, developing countries may wish to seek funding for legal support centers in
Washington and Brussels to complement the Advisory Centre. Much of the legal action for
market access takes place before U.S. and EC administrative bodies, in particular in
antidumping, subsidy, and safeguard cases. These cases can be extremely expensive, so
expensive that many developing country enterprises simply cease exporting to the United States
or Europe upon the initiation of a complaint. Statistical evidence reveals that lower income
developing countries fare far worse in U.S. antidumping proceedings than do developed country
defendants. They “are more likely to be targeted, less likely to settle cases, more likely to
confront high dumping duties and less likely to bring cases to the WTO.”49 Developing a legal
“delegates of Peru have attended the lunch-time [ACWL] training sessions in all three years.” The author thanks an
anonymous referee for this point.
45
Discussion with member of the Advisory Centre, November 2004.
46

See e.g., US-Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products, in which the Centre unsuccessfully represented
India. Some governments may retain private counsel themselves, instead of the Advisory Centre, in light of their
determination of the case’s relative importance, private counsel’s reputation and cost-effectiveness, and the
country’s past experience. Interview with delegates from Brazil and Chile, among other WTO missions, Geneva,
June 2003 and 2004.
47

Japan has also been a frequent third party. See Shaffer, Defending Interests, supra note…, at 157.
Confirmed by Leo Palme of the Advisory Centre, Feb. 1, 2005.
49
See Chad Bown, Bernard Bernard Hoekman & Caglar Ozden, “The Pattern of US Antidumping: The Path from
Initial Filing to WTO Dispute.” 2:3 World Trade Review 349-371 (November 2003).
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resource center in Washington and Brussels to provide developing countries with partially
subsidized legal support may be difficult, but that does not detract from its importance. One
possibility could be to tie such a center to a law school, similar to the way in which the Center
for International Environmental Law (CIEL) “directs a joint research and teaching program with
the American University Washington College of Law” in Washington D.C.. As CIEL’s web site
note, the program includes “on-the-job experience through an extensive internship program…
[whose] participants are drawn from the Washington College of Law’s Master of Laws program
which each year enrolls 180 foreign lawyers from 60 countries from around the world.”50 This
initiative could be easier to accomplish in the United States in light of US law schools’
experience with clinical programs that provide course credit, although analogous mechanisms
could be explored in Brussels.
WTO cases increasingly involve challenges to U.S. and EC trade remedy procedures.51 In
mid-2004, trade remedy cases comprised slightly over one-half of the twenty-three active panel
and Appellate Body proceedings.52 The U.S. and EC were respectively the two major targets. In
these cases, the Appellate Body has sometimes refrained from finding that U.S. and European
import relief laws themselves violate WTO obligations, and rather held against U.S. and
European administrative practices.53 Developing countries must thus develop a factual and legal
record in the U.S. and EC domestic proceeding if they are to successfully pursue a matter before
the WTO.
Parties also need to ensure that U.S. and European administrative bodies take account of
WTO jurisprudence in applying domestic law. Although WTO law has no direct effect in the
United States or Europe, domestic administrative bodies and courts should take account of WTO
law in interpreting the relevant domestic statutes on the ground that the statutes were intended to
implement WTO law. The European Court of Justice has expressly maintained that it will
interpret EC law to conform, where possible, with EC obligations under WTO agreements.54
50

The quotation is from CIEL’s home page at http://www.ciel.org/reciel.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
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From the WTO’s formation through September 2001, WTO members filed eighteen complaints against the United
States in respect of its antidumping and countervailing duty laws and six additional complaints against U.S.
application of its import safeguards law. During the first nine months of 2001 alone, WTO members filed seven new
requests for consultations and panel formations in respect of U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws and
measures. In a three week period at the end of the summer of 2001, WTO panels were formed to hear challenges on
four separate challenges against U.S. import protection laws and proceedings. See, e.g., “U.S. Peppered with WTO
Complaints, Criticizes Prior Rulings,” 19 Inside U.S. Trade 6 (Aug. 24, 2001).
52
See Rossella Brevetti, “Fewer WTO Cases Filed So Far in 2004, Legal Affairs Director Wilson Says,”
International Trade Reporter (BNA), vol 21: 34, at 1378 (Aug. 19, 2004) (“Wilson said that 53 percent are trade
remedy cases and 47 percent are non-trade remedy cases”).
53

See, e.g., Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products
from the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R (Nov. 22, 2002), para. 161 (reversing the panel’s decision that
certain provisions of U.S. countervailing duty law did not conform with the United States’ obligations under the
SCM Agreement, but upholding the panel’s decision that the U.S. administrative determinations were made in a
manner “inconsistent” with the SCM Agreement, and “requesting” the United States to bring its “administrative
practice... into conformity with its [WTO] obligations”).
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See e.g. Case C-53/96, Hermes Int’l v FHT Mktg. Choice BV, 1998 ECR I-3603 (1998).
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There is likewise long-standing U.S. Supreme Court precedent that “an Act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.”55
This jurisprudence was cited with approval in the U.S. domestic litigation following the
Appellate Body’s U.S.-shrimp-turtle decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
overruled the lower court and interpreted the U.S. statute in conformity with the Appellate
Body’s finding of WTO requirements, after taking note of the WTO case.56 The Federal Circuit
took a similar position in overruling a lower court in an antidumping case against steel imports in
2003, citing a WTO decision as support even though noting that it was not bound by WTO
jurisprudence.57
Developing countries could also pool their resources through regional centers to assist
them in defining trade priorities, coordinating negotiating strategies, building public-private
networks, identifying trade barriers, and (potentially) providing legal support in WTO
litigation.58 These regional centers could, for example, assist the Advisory Centre in WTO
litigation. A Trade Law Center has been established in southern Africa and countries have
explored creating one in Cairo, Egypt as well.59 States within regions face diverse challenges and
their national interests can conflict, so that the development of regional centers faces significant
challenges.60 Nonetheless, taking from the European example, countries increasingly realize the
benefits to be gained from coordinating and pooling their resources.61 The pragmatic challenge
of pooling resources at the regional level needs to be compared with the alternative of each

55

Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 188 (1804) (Marshall C.J.) (known as the “Charming
Betsy” rule).
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Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Donald Evans, 284 F.3d 1282, 1289-1290 (2002) (majority). When an
environmental group challenged the revised U.S. State Department regulations, the U.S. government argued that the
WTO ruling constituted “the law of nations,” and that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.” See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Donald Evans,
284 F.3d 1282, 1303 (2002) (dissent).
57

See Nippon Steel Corp. v United States, 337 F.3d 1373 (2003) and Allegheny Ludlum Corp. V United States, 367
F.3d 1339. Compare Appellate Body Report, United States - Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products
from the European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R, adopted Jan. 8, 2003.
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See e.g., Peter Drahos, “When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization,”
8 International Negotiation 79-109 (2003).
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See Victor Mosoti, Does Africa Need the WTO Dispute Settlement System?, (ICTSD, Geneva) 1-28 (2003)
available at http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2003-02-07/Mosoti.pdf. ”
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See, e.g., Paul-Henri Bischoff, “How Far, Where To? Regionalism, the Southern African Development
Community and Decision-Making into the Millennium,” in eds. Korwa Gombe & Adar Rok Ajulu (2002),
Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States’ Foreign Policy-Making Process (Ashgate Pub.) p.299.
(“However, the durability of national interests and intensification of transnational influences have not helped the
SADC [Southern African Development Community] as a model of regional organization”).
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See e.g. Thomas Catan, “Mercosur seeks to build ties with Mexico,” Financial Times, July 6, 2002 at 2.
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developing country working on its own, in which case the trading powers can more easily play
developing countries off of each other.62
Finally, the Advisory Centre and developing countries could work with academics that
specialize in WTO law on a consultancy or pro bono basis. National and regional trade law
advisory centers on trade law could affiliate with universities in developing countries, as has the
Trade Law Center for Southern Africa (“TRALAC”) with the University of Stellenbosch.63
Some U.S. legal scholars have already worked on amicus curiae briefs in WTO cases, although
they have generally sided with the great powers against developing country complainants, as in
the U.S.-shrimp and EC-sardines cases. Many legal academics, however, might welcome the
possibility of assisting developing countries on a WTO case.64 Not only would they provide a
needed public service, but their own scholarship would benefit.
Most of the legal scholarship read in Geneva by WTO officials is written by U.S. and
European scholars who are socialized to think of law from a U.S. or European perspective. As
critical and constructivist scholars note, these scholars can exercise power in a diffuse, but
important, way.65 Through their work, they can shape perceptions and the appreciation of
alternatives. By working with developing countries on international trade cases, academics
would better learn how the WTO process works in practice. They could write contextualized
analyses of WTO jurisprudence that are more informed by a developing country perspective.
3. The Political Challenge: The Need for North-South NGO-Government Alliances. The
third major challenge is that developing countries will often face extra-legal pressure from
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See e.g. Peter Drahos, “When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization,”
8 International Negotiation 79-109 (2003). See also Gregory Shaffer and Yvonne Apea, “Institutional Choice in the
GSP Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences: The Law and Politics of Rights,” Journal of World
Trade (forthcoming 2005). Developing countries would of course have to monitor and develop trust that the
secretariats of regional associations and the lead representatives in regional networks work effectively on their
behalf.
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See e.g., Peter Drahos and Michael Blakeney, Rockefeller Report for Bellagio Conference (2002), cited in
Reichman, “Managing the Challenge of a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime” (draft for the second Bellagio
meeting on Intellectual Property and Development 2003) (on file) (proposing the formation of an “Academic
Resource Group”).
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See e.g. Richard Ashley, “The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty and the Domestication of Global Life,”
reprinted in James der Derian, ed., International Theory: Critical Investigations 101 (1995) (“By contrast, my
analysis looks to knowledgeable practices as productive relations of power. It looks to the way in which
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Ronen Palen, “The Constuctivist Underpinnings of the New International Political Economy, in Palen, ed, Global
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social position of the knower”); and Clarissa Rile Hayward, De-Facing Power (Cambridge University Press: 2000)
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powerful countries, undermining the goal of objective trade dispute resolution through law.66 The
powerful can exploit power imbalances and rhetorically rationalize their actions in non-powerbased terms. There may be little that a small developing country can do to counter threats to
withdraw preferential tariff benefits or foreign aid–even food aid–were the country to challenge a
trade measure.67 Such political tactics can undermine developing country faith in the efficacy of
the legal system. The use of such tactics is not surprising. In domestic contractual disputes
involving firms that exercise market power, these firms also benefit from the use of explicit and
implicit threats.68 Developing countries can nonetheless better cope with them by adopting moreeffective strategies to attempt to constrain extra-legal pressures. As some recent cases
demonstrate, developing countries can forge alliances with constituencies within the global
powers. By harnessing domestic political pressure and legal expertise within the United States
and Europe, developing countries can curtail, at least somewhat, great power political pressure
and otherwise offset some of the resource imbalances that they face.
An example of a relatively successful north-south alliance is that between developing
countries and northern-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Doctors Without
Borders, concerning the recognition, scope, and enforcement of pharmaceutical patent rights.
Together, they helped counter U.S. pressure on developing countries to enforce U.S.
pharmaceutical company patents under a strict interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”). First, the United States withdrew
its threat of initiating a WTO claim against South Africa in response to pressure from AIDS
activists on Vice President Gore’s presidential campaign.69 Second, in June 2001, the Bush
66

Guzman and Simmons find that statistical evidence concerning the selection of defendants suggests that
developing country selection is more likely to be explained by capacity factors than power-based ones. See Andrew
Guzman & Beth Simmons, “Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in WTO Disputes,”
Journal of Legal Studies (forthcoming 2005). Nonetheless, this author’s interviews confirmed that smaller
developing countries frequently face political constraints in initiating a WTO complaint.
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what would be the consequences if the minister did not reply on Wednesday or said no. The minister responded that
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administration withdrew the United States’ claim against Brazil’s compulsory licensing
provisions under Brazil’s patent law in the context of widespread protest against the U.S. action
from advocacy groups who maintained that the U.S. government was placing corporate interests
above life-and-death medical concerns.70 This NGO pressure was complemented by prodding
from international health organizations.71 Third, USTR Robert Zoellick abandoned the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry with little consultation in agreeing to the “Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health” at Doha.72 The United States again backed down just before the
September 2003 Cancun WTO ministerial meeting concerning the right of developing countries
without manufacturing capacity to issue compulsory licenses for the importation of generic
drugs.73 Even though northern activists and developing countries would like to go further in
modifying and officially interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, they have helped to counter
aggressive pressure and shifted the terms of debate over the protection of pharmaceutical patents.
Similarly, developing countries can work with northern consumer groups in bringing
WTO claims. In the case EC-Trade Description for Sardines, the UK Consumers’ Association,
the largest consumers association in Europe and the second largest in the world, worked with a
UK law firm, Clyde & Co, on a pro bono basis to prepare an amicus curiae brief in support of
Peru’s submissions to the WTO panel. In this case, Peru challenged an EC regulation that would
See Gary Yerkey, “President Orders Easing of IPR Policy For Sub-Saharan Africa to Help Fight AIDS,” 17
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 792 (May 18, 2000).
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See, e.g., “U.S., Brazil End WTO Case on Patents, Split on Bilateral Process,” 19 Inside U.S. Trade 1, 2 (June
29, 2001) (“Informed sources said the U.S. backpedaling from the WTO panel, which it had requested in February,
reflected an unwillingness on the part of U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick to give opponents of trade
liberalization a red-hot issue that appeared to give credence to the idea of the WTO interfering with poor countries’
health policies.”). Doctors Without Borders declared that Brazil’s patent policy was key to the success of the
Brazil’s strategy to offer universal access to HIV/AIDS medication in Brazil. Brazil’s health program includes free
distribution of antiretroviral drugs produced in Brazil. This program has allegedly reduced AIDS deaths by 50
percent since it was introduced and saved the government an estimated $422 million in hospitalization and medical
care costs. See Daniel Pruzin, “US Responds to Criticisms of Brazilian Patent Law Complaint,” 18 International
Trade Reporter (BNA) 238 (February 8, 2001). Oxfam, a British NGO, backed Brazil’s efforts, maintaining that the
U.S. complaint was an assault on public health. See Drug Companies vs. Brazil: The Threat to Public Health,
available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/brazilctc/ctcbraz.htm.
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not permit Peruvian fish to be sold as “sardines” within the EC, even though they could be sold
throughout the world as sardines in accordance with an international standard agreed under the
auspices of the Codex Alimentarius Commission.74 The ten-page brief of the Consumers’
Association addressed how the EC regulation “clearly acts against the economic and information
interests of Europe’s consumers” and constitutes “base protectionism in favour of a particular
industry within the EU,” the Spanish fishing industry. Thanks to the Consumers’ Association and
its law firm, Peru and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law received free legal research and
counsel on such issues as the history and application of the EC regulations and the Codex
standard-setting procedures,.
The Advisory Centre attached the association’s amicus brief to Peru’s legal submission
and quoted it with approval.75 The brief had an impact on the WTO panel, which cited it
concerning European consumer views.76 When the EC challenged the panel’s use of the
Consumers’ Association brief during interim review, the panel confirmed that it justifiably
considered the brief “in determining whether the European consumers associate the term
‘sardines’ exclusively with Sardina pilchardus,” the fish variety swimming in European waters.
The panel then found that European consumers did not associate sardines exclusively with this
variety, in contradiction of the EC’s position. There was thus no reason that the Peruvian species
could not be sold as sardines in the EC market. The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s central
findings in favor of Peru.
The Advisory Centre on WTO Law can assist in the forging of these north-south NGOgovernment alliances. Since the Centre’s lawyers are repeat players in WTO litigation, and since
they are based in Geneva, the home of the WTO, they more easily can develop relations with
northern groups to provide assistance in specific trade matters.77 The Advisory Centre’s general
policy is to post its legal submissions on the Centre’s web site, facilitating interaction with
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NGOs, lawyers, academics, and others.78 Some developing country NGOs, such as Consumer
Unity & Trust Society (CUTS) based in India, are also attempting to help forge north-south
alliances.79 Oxfam, for example, has been a major supporter of Brazil’s challenges to U.S. and
European cotton and sugar subsidies.80 As happened for Peru in the sardines case, these alliances
can help undermine the opposing party’s factual and legal positions. By shaping the normative
and political contexts in which legal challenges occur, they can also countervail industry pressure
on executive departments in larger developed countries to take aggressive stances toward
developing countries in the first place.
International negotiations involve a two-level game in which national constituencies
compete in the formation of national positions and those national positions are then advanced in
international negotiations.81 If developing countries cannot neutralize the clout of U.S. and
European firms in the formation of U.S. and European positions, then developing countries will
more likely face the full brunt of U.S. and European pressure in regards to pharmaceutical
patents and other WTO claims. In a world of asymmetric power, developing countries enhance
the prospects of their success if other U.S. and European constituencies can offset industry
pressure on U.S. and European trade authorities. Developing countries need to work with these
constituencies to alter the domestic political playing fields of the other side.
4. Conclusion.
If developing countries are to participate meaningfully in the WTO dispute settlement
system, they will need to continue to increase institutional capacity and coordination of trade
policy at multiple levels, from the national to the regional to the global. They will need, in
particular, to develop their own coordinative mechanisms to include private sector and civil
society representatives. Capacity building endeavors generally will be most sustainable if they
permeate broadly throughout institutions and societies.82
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20
If developing countries are to deploy WTO law to their advantage, they will need to
maintain routine on-going procedures for gathering, processing and prioritizing information from
foreign embassies, the private sector, and international trade consultants regarding foreign trade
barriers. By working more consistently with the private sector, developing country officials can
foster the development of reflexes in firms and trade associations to view the WTO as an
opportunity to ensure market access, thereby more effectively using the WTO system to their
advantage. Brazil has gone a long way toward institutionalizing this coordination in WTO
dispute settlement, and Brazil has become a much more active and successful user of the system
as a result.83 Building requisite developing country public-private networks will take time. Yet it
is an essential task if the WTO dispute settlement system is to work for them.
Many developing countries are learning to use the WTO dispute settlement system more
effectively. The Advisory Centre, with its growing experience and knowledge of the system,
represents a significant advance. Private law firms are likewise dedicating more resources to
WTO dispute settlement into which some developing countries can tap. With time, developing
countries should be able to gain a greater strategic sense of how to use the dispute settlement
system and to work with broader networks of public and private actors to advance their concerns.
They will always be at a significant disadvantage because of material and informational resource
constraints and political factors that they cannot control. Yet the WTO legal system can also
offer opportunities for them.
Since developing countries face different contexts, there is no single strategy that fits all
of them. Exporting legal strategies across cultures regardless of context has never worked.84
Each country will need to determine how best to adapt the strategies that this paper explores in
light of its particular circumstances. Many countries already have adopted many of them to a
varying extent. The paper’s central purpose is to highlight options and provoke imaginative
debate and experimentation with strategies that developing countries and their constituencies
may adopt to better defend themselves in the international trading system.
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